by Jason Tarnow | Jun 30, 2026 | Crime, Media, Police, Wheels Of Justice
As a Vancouver criminal defence lawyer with years of experience advocating for clients in British Columbia courts, I’ve seen firsthand how shifts in the Criminal Code can dramatically alter the landscape for those facing charges. Just days ago, on June 15, 2026, the Bail and Sentencing Reform Act (Bill C-14) received Royal Assent. This sweeping legislation introduces over 80 targeted changes to bail, sentencing, the Youth Criminal Justice Act, and related provisions. Set to come into force on July 15, 2026, these reforms mark one of the most significant updates to Canadian criminal law in recent memory.
For anyone in Vancouver dealing with criminal allegations—whether involving violence, organized crime, auto theft, or repeat offending—this isn’t just abstract policy. It’s a game-changer that demands immediate attention from defendants, their families, and legal practitioners. In this post, I break down the key elements of Bill C-14, analyze its implications for Charter rights and defence strategy, and offer practical takeaways for those navigating the justice system in BC.
The Backdrop: Why These Reforms Now?
Canada’s bail system has long balanced the presumption of innocence with public safety concerns. Landmark Supreme Court of Canada decisions, such as those emphasizing the “ladder principle” (starting with the least restrictive conditions) and the principle of restraint, have guided courts toward release at the earliest reasonable opportunity.
However, rising concerns over repeat violent offenders, extortion rackets (particularly acute in parts of the Lower Mainland), auto theft rings, and crimes targeting critical infrastructure prompted this response. Bill C-14 responds by tightening bail for specific serious offences and toughening sentencing across the board. British Columbia has been vocal in advocating for many of these changes, especially around reverse onus provisions for intimate partner violence and repeat offending.
The legislation doesn’t overhaul the entire system but delivers precise, impactful amendments aimed at violent and organized crime, home invasions, human trafficking, and more.
Key Changes to Bail Laws Under Bill C-14
The most immediate impact for defence counsel in Vancouver will be on bail hearings. Here are the standout reforms:
- Expanded Reverse Onus Provisions: For a growing list of offences—including those involving violence, choking/suffocation/strangulation, breaking and entering, auto theft, and organized crime—the burden shifts to the accused to show why detention is not justified. This reverses the traditional onus on the Crown.
- Stricter Considerations for Detention: Courts must now weigh additional factors when assessing whether detention is necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice. Weapons prohibitions at the bail stage are expanded, particularly for extortion and organized crime cases.
- Modifications to Core Principles: The legislation clarifies and, in some cases, limits the application of the ladder principle and principle of restraint for certain charges. Release is no longer as presumptively favored in high-risk categories.
- Post-Guilty Verdict Bail: After a finding of guilt but before sentencing, prosecutors can seek to vacate release orders with a reverse onus on the accused.
In Vancouver and Surrey, where organized crime and extortion-related violence have been pressing issues, these changes will likely result in more contested bail hearings and higher detention rates for qualifying offences.
Sentencing Reforms: Tougher Penalties and Reduced Discretion
On the sentencing side, Bill C-14 introduces or enhances aggravating factors, restricts conditional sentences (house arrest) for serious sexual offences (including against children), and emphasizes consecutive sentencing in certain scenarios. It also targets retail theft, crimes against first responders, and infrastructure offences.
These provisions aim to deliver “meaningful consequences,” but they raise important questions about judicial discretion and proportionality—core tenets of Canadian sentencing law rooted in cases like R. v. Gladue for Indigenous offenders and broader Charter considerations under section 12 (cruel and unusual punishment).
Critics, including civil liberties groups, have warned that expanded reverse onuses and restrictions could disproportionately affect marginalized communities, including Indigenous, racialized, and low-income individuals in BC. Defence lawyers must remain vigilant about potential Charter challenges.
Implications for Vancouver Criminal Defence Practitioners and Defendants
As someone practicing in Vancouver’s bustling courthouses, I anticipate several practical shifts:
- Bail Hearings Will Be More Rigorous: Expect Crown counsel to push harder for detention. Defence teams will need robust release plans, emphasizing sureties, electronic monitoring, treatment programs, and community ties. Gathering strong evidence of low risk—employment records, counseling engagement, or family support—becomes even more critical.
- Strategic Adjustments Pre-Charge and Early: Early intervention is key. In cases touching organized crime or repeat offences, advising clients on self-surrender, proactive rehabilitation, or negotiating with police/Crown at the investigative stage may mitigate risks.
- Sentencing Advocacy: With restrictions on conditional sentences and emphasis on denunciation, lawyers must craft compelling submissions highlighting mitigating factors, rehabilitation potential, and Gladue principles where applicable. Charter arguments around mandatory minimums or overbreadth could gain renewed importance.
- Youth and Specialized Cases: Amendments to the Youth Criminal Justice Act warrant close scrutiny for young clients.
For defendants in BC facing charges like assault, theft, or drug-related matters linked to organized activity, the window for securing release narrows. This heightens the stakes for thorough preparation.
Balancing Public Safety and Fairness: A Defence Perspective
These reforms reflect a policy push toward accountability and community safety—goals few would dispute in the face of real harms from repeat offending. However, as criminal defence lawyers, our role is to ensure the pendulum doesn’t swing so far that it erodes fundamental rights.
The presumption of innocence remains bedrock. Many provisions in Bill C-14 will face judicial scrutiny, potentially leading to future Supreme Court guidance. In the interim, vigilant advocacy is essential to protect clients from unjust pretrial detention, which can devastate employment, housing, and family stability.
In Vancouver’s diverse context, with its unique challenges around addiction, mental health, and urban crime, a one-size-fits-all tougher approach risks unintended consequences. Effective justice requires both strong laws and individualized assessment.
Practical Takeaways for Those Facing Charges
- Act Quickly: If you or a loved one is under investigation or arrested after July 15, 2026, consult experienced Vancouver criminal defence counsel immediately. Bail strategies must adapt to the new framework.
- Build a Strong Record: Engage in counseling, maintain employment, and document positive steps. These are powerful tools in bail and sentencing hearings.
- Understand Your Rights: Reverse onus doesn’t eliminate the right to a fair hearing. Skilled cross-examination and evidence can still secure release.
- Stay Informed: Legislative changes like Bill C-14 evolve through case law. Follow developments from the BC Supreme Court, Provincial Court, and SCC.
The coming months will reveal how judges interpret these amendments. Defence bar collaboration and targeted litigation will help shape equitable application.
In conclusion, Bill C-14’s bail and sentencing reforms signal a tougher stance on serious crime while challenging practitioners to innovate in defence strategies. For Vancouver defendants, the message is clear: preparation and expert representation have never been more vital.
At our firm, we remain committed to fighting for fair outcomes amid these changes. If you’re facing criminal allegations in BC, reach out for a consultation. Knowledge and strategic advocacy remain your strongest allies.
This blog post is for educational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Every case is unique—consult a qualified Vancouver criminal defence lawyer for advice tailored to your situation.
by Jason Tarnow | May 15, 2026 | Crime, Police, Wheels Of Justice
If a police officer walks up your driveway at midnight, knocks on your truck window, and opens the door without a warrant, has your Charter right to be secure from unreasonable search and seizure been violated? As a criminal lawyer in Vancouver, I get versions of this question all the time — from clients facing impaired driving charges, from homeowners who feel their privacy was invaded, and from people who simply want to know where the constitutional line sits between policing and private life.
On March 20, 2026, the Supreme Court of Canada answered that question with more clarity than we have had in nearly thirty years. The decision is R. v. Singer, 2026 SCC 8, and every driver, homeowner, and impaired driving client in British Columbia and the Yukon should understand what it changed — and what it did not.
This post breaks down the facts, the legal doctrine, the result, and the practical takeaways for accused persons and the lawyers who defend them. It is written from the perspective of counsel who runs Charter applications in BC courtrooms regularly. None of it is legal advice; if you are charged with an offence, retain counsel.
Key Takeaways
- The Supreme Court of Canada confirmed in R. v. Singer, 2026 SCC 8 that police have an implied licence to enter a residential driveway and approach a vehicle to knock on the window when investigating an impaired driving complaint.
- That implied licence ends at the vehicle door. Opening the door without a warrant, exigent circumstances, or another lawful authority is a search under section 8 of the Charter.
- The Court still admitted the evidence under section 24(2), citing the seriousness of impaired driving offences — but the breach finding is the part that matters for future cases.
- For drivers in British Columbia and the Yukon, Singer sharpens the boundary between lawful investigative steps and constitutionally significant intrusion.
- If you have been charged after a roadside or driveway investigation, a careful Charter review is essential before any plea is entered.
The Facts: A Driveway, a Truck, and a 911 Call
The accused in Singer was the subject of a third-party complaint about a possibly impaired driver. Two RCMP officers attended his residence and found his pickup truck running in the driveway. He was inside the cab. Without a warrant, the officers walked up the driveway, approached the truck, and knocked on the driver’s window. When that did not produce the response they wanted, they opened the door. What followed — observations, a roadside demand under section 320.27 of the Criminal Code, and ultimately a charge under section 320.14 — flowed directly from that initial driveway encounter.
The defence position at trial, on appeal, and at the Supreme Court was straightforward: the entire investigative sequence was tainted by an unreasonable search of a private residential property, contrary to section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Crown’s position was equally clear: police were doing the very kind of front-line community work that the implied licence doctrine has long permitted.
The Implied Licence Doctrine — A Centuries-Old Rule, Newly Tested
The implied licence doctrine is not new. It was articulated in modern form in R. v. Evans, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 8, where Justice Sopinka explained that the common law treats every member of the public — including police — as having an implied invitation to walk up to the door of a dwelling and knock for a legitimate purpose. The reasoning is grounded in social custom: occupiers know that mail carriers, neighbours, and door-to-door visitors will approach their door, and they have implicitly waived the privacy interest in that limited approach.
Three points have always been understood to follow from Evans:
- The licence is limited to the purpose of communicating with the occupant. If the actual purpose is to gather evidence, the licence does not authorize the entry.
- The licence is limited to the route ordinarily used by visitors, typically a walkway or driveway leading to the door.
- The licence ends at the door of the dwelling. Anything beyond — opening a door, peering through a window, lingering — can constitute a search.
What Singer contributes is a clear application of those principles to a vehicle parked in a driveway, which had been a recurring point of confusion in lower courts across the country, including in impaired driving prosecutions here in BC.
Where the Police Crossed the Line
A majority of the Court (Wagner C.J., Côté, Rowe, Kasirer and Jamal JJ.) drew the line in two parts.
Step one was permissible. Walking up the driveway and approaching the truck to knock on the window was within the implied licence. The officers had a legitimate investigative purpose — a recent third-party report of impaired driving — and they used the ordinary route a visitor would use to communicate with the occupant. The Court held this conduct was not a “search” within the meaning of section 8.
Step two was not. When the officers opened the truck door without consent, a warrant, exigent circumstances, or another lawful authority, they intruded upon a reasonable expectation of privacy that the accused continued to hold in the interior of his vehicle. That was a search, and it was unreasonable. The Charter breach was made out.
This bifurcated analysis is significant. It tells defence counsel and trial judges to look at each step of the investigative sequence separately, rather than treating the entire driveway encounter as either lawful or unlawful in one breath.
The Section 24(2) Result — Why the Evidence Got In Anyway
Despite finding the breach, the Court declined to exclude the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter. Applying the framework from R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32 — seriousness of the breach, impact on the accused’s Charter-protected interests, and society’s interest in adjudication on the merits — the majority concluded that admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
The Court emphasized society’s strong interest in prosecuting impaired driving, an offence that kills and injures Canadians at staggering rates. That weighting is consistent with the recent trajectory of Charter jurisprudence in driving cases, where courts have generally been reluctant to exclude reliable physical evidence of impairment.
For defence counsel, the lesson is sobering but realistic: a Charter breach is not a guaranteed exclusion. Counsel must build a record at trial that addresses each Grant factor with care.
What Singer Means for Drivers and Homeowners in British Columbia
BC and the Yukon have some of the most active impaired driving enforcement programs in Canada. Between RoadSafetyBC’s Immediate Roadside Prohibition regime, mandatory alcohol screening at lawful traffic stops, and a steady stream of third-party 911 calls reporting suspected impaired drivers, the driveway scenario in Singer is not unusual — it is a Friday night.
Three practical points stand out for clients in this jurisdiction:
First, your driveway is not your living room, but it is not the highway either. Police can walk up to investigate or to knock, but they cannot use the driveway as a launchpad for a wider warrantless search of your vehicle or your person. If officers reached into the cab, opened a door, or directed you out of the vehicle without lawful authority, that is a fact pattern worth scrutinizing.
Second, the moment of intrusion matters. Counsel will want to know when the door was opened, what was said immediately before, whether any demand under section 320.27 or 320.28 of the Criminal Code had been made, whether the officer formed reasonable grounds before or after the door opened, and whether the accused was detained at that point for the purposes of section 10 of the Charter.
Third, the Yukon dimension matters too. Many of my files involve clients charged in remote communities where RCMP detachments are small and dwellings are spread over large rural lots. The implied licence doctrine applies the same way, but the factual question of “ordinary route to the door” can look very different on a five-acre Yukon property than on a Vancouver cul-de-sac. Local context drives the analysis.
Defence Strategies After Singer — What Your Lawyer Will Examine
If you are facing an impaired driving charge in British Columbia or the Yukon arising out of a driveway or property entry, a careful defence lawyer will canvass the following:
- The basis for the entry. Was there a 911 call? A welfare check? An anonymous tip? The legitimacy and specificity of the investigative purpose anchors the implied licence analysis.
- The route taken. Did officers follow a normal pedestrian path, or did they cut across a fenced yard, peer through windows, or approach a vehicle parked behind the dwelling out of public view?
- The point of intrusion. Was the door of the vehicle opened, was the trunk opened, was the accused commanded out, was a flashlight directed into a closed cab? Each is a discrete question.
- The grounds for any demand. Were the grounds for an approved screening device demand formed lawfully and before the demand was articulated?
- The Charter caution and right to counsel. Was section 10(b) complied with promptly upon detention?
- The Grant analysis. Even where a breach is established, the section 24(2) record must be built deliberately at trial.
None of this is theoretical. These are the questions I work through with clients in initial consultations, and they are the questions Crown counsel anticipate when they assess a file for resolution or trial.
How Singer Connects to Broader Section 8 Jurisprudence
It is worth situating Singer within the modern Charter landscape. The Supreme Court has been steadily clarifying the contours of reasonable expectation of privacy in cases like R. v. Tessling, 2004 SCC 67 (FLIR overflights), R. v. Patrick, 2009 SCC 17 (curbside garbage), R. v. Marakah, 2017 SCC 59 (text messages), and R. v. Bykovets, 2024 SCC 6 (IP addresses). Singer fits in the line that addresses the home and its immediate surroundings — the so-called “curtilage” — and reaffirms that the constitutional protection of the home extends, in attenuated form, to the spaces that surround it.
Defence lawyers should expect Singer to be cited well beyond impaired driving cases. Anywhere the police step onto private residential property to gather information — drug investigations, weapons calls, even welfare checks that turn evidentiary — the bifurcated Singer analysis will travel.
Frequently Asked Questions
Can the police walk up my driveway in British Columbia without a warrant?
Yes, in most circumstances. Under the implied licence doctrine reaffirmed in R. v. Singer, 2026 SCC 8, police may walk up a residential driveway and approach the door — or, in Singer, a vehicle in the driveway — for a legitimate investigative purpose such as knocking to communicate with the occupant. That implied licence ends at the door.
Can the police open my car door if it is parked in my driveway?
Generally, no — not without a warrant, consent, exigent circumstances, or another lawful authority. Singer confirms that opening the door of a vehicle in a residential driveway is a search under section 8 of the Charter. If your charge stems from such an entry, raise it with counsel immediately.
Does R. v. Singer mean my impaired driving charge will be dismissed?
Not automatically. The Supreme Court found a Charter breach in Singer but admitted the evidence anyway under section 24(2). Whether evidence is excluded in your case depends on the seriousness of the breach, its impact on you, and society’s interest in adjudication on the merits — the framework set out in R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32. A careful trial record is essential.
Do I have to answer the door if police knock?
No. The implied licence permits police to approach and knock; it does not compel you to answer or to consent to anything. You are entitled to remain silent and to speak to counsel without delay if you are detained or arrested.
I was charged in the Yukon, not BC. Does Singer apply?
Yes. R. v. Singer, 2026 SCC 8 is a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada and binds courts in every province and territory, including the Yukon Territorial Court and the Supreme Court of Yukon. The factual application may look different in remote or rural settings, but the legal framework is the same.
A Note on Authority and Disclaimer
This post is general legal commentary, not legal advice. Every case turns on its facts, and the impaired driving and Charter framework is technical. If you have been charged with an offence in British Columbia or the Yukon — or if police have entered your property in circumstances that concern you — speak with a criminal defence lawyer before making any statement, entering any plea, or accepting any roadside or administrative penalty.
About the author — Jason Tarnow is a criminal defence lawyer based in Vancouver, British Columbia. He represents clients facing charges across BC and the Yukon, with particular focus on impaired driving, Charter applications, and serious indictable matters. He regularly argues section 8, 9 and 10 motions in trial and appellate courts.
Charged with an offence in BC or the Yukon?
If you have been arrested, detained, or charged — or if you believe police entered your property unlawfully — do not wait. Early advice often makes the difference between a manageable resolution and a lasting record. Contact Jason Tarnow for a confidential consultation. Serving Vancouver, the Lower Mainland, and clients across British Columbia and the Yukon.
by Jason Tarnow | Jan 19, 2024 | Crime, Legal Rights, Media, Police, Wheels Of Justice
How would you feel if your DNA was used to convict a family member?
Last week, news consumers were divided on the use of this tactic to identify and arrest Ibrahim Ali who was recently convicted of the murder and sexual assault of a 13 year old victim in 2017 in Burnaby.
Investigators went undercover at a 2018 Kurdish New Year Celebration handing out samples of tea in hopes of collecting DNA from their suspect – and it worked. Police were able to obtain a sample from a relative of the suspect. The sample was analyzed and compared against the DNA sample collected from semen found inside the victim, and the results were conclusive: the sample collected at the Kurdish New Year Celebration belonged to the brother of the whomever’s DNA was found inside the victim. This critical development resulted in the positive identification of Ibrahim Ali, his subsequent arrest and ultimately, his conviction.
However, certain civil liberties advocates have decried this investigative strategy, claiming it infringes on the privacy rights of people who have their DNA seized when they themselves are not suspected of any wrongdoing. Further, genealogical DNA testing is not frequently accessed or available technology in Canada. As a result, the analysis is often done in the United States, further stoking concerns from privacy experts. Police are required to maintain a “chain of custody” for all exhibits in a case. When the exhibits are forensic material, it is especially important that the chain of custody be meticulously maintained. This becomes increasingly difficult when exhibits leave the custody of Canadian agencies. Further, labs in the United States (and beyond) may not be accredited to the same standard as a Canadian lab. And of course, when private and sensitive material exists in the database of outside agencies, there is always a security risk.
Genealogical DNA testing and its use in criminal law is still very much in its infancy – in Canada, anyways.
This investigational technique gained notoriety in 2018 when it was used to identify and convict the Golden State killer in California, and made headlines again in December 2022 when it was used to identify Bryan Kohberger, currently awaiting trial for the murder of four college students at the University of Idaho.
Canadian Courts and legislators are no doubt paying close attention to developments in the field of Genealogical DNA testing. It is more important now than ever – in the age of ever-advancing scientific exploration and sophisticated tools like AI – that the Courts, and the law, can maintain pace.
by Jason Tarnow | Feb 24, 2022 | Crime, Media, Police
A Vancouver man suffering from long haul COVID-19 symptoms was successful in the judicial review of his 90-day Immediate Roadside Prohibition (“IRP”) after arguing that the Adjudicator breached his right to procedural fairness in his original review to RoadSafety BC.
On February 11, 2021, Peter Ronald Gibson was issued an IRP after the police officer alleged he refused to provide a sample. Mr. Gibson made 7 attempts into the Approved Screening Device, none of which successfully yielded a suitable sample. As a result, his vehicle was impounded for 30 days, and he was prohibited from driving for 90 days.
Mr. Gibson sought a review of his IRP to RoadSafety BC, delegate of the Superintendent of Motor Vehicles on the basis that he had a reasonable excuse for failing to provide a breath sample. In Mr. Gibson’s original review, he provided evidence in the form of his Affidavit. He also provided a letter from his physician that confirmed his diagnosis – he was suffering from long term symptoms as a result of COVID-19, including shortness of breath on exertion.
The letter reads:
“His physical examination shows evidence of post-viral reactive airways with sever forced expiratory wheeze. He has been given prescriptions for Flovent and Salbutamol inhalers today. This could contribute to his difficulty performing breathalyzer test during recent traffic stop”
The Adjudicator at RoadSafety BC rejected the letter from Mr. Gibson’s physician, stating that there was no evidence that the physician was aware of the “minimum flow rate (of breath)” required to provide a sample. Mr. Gibson also provided his own Affidavit, which confirmed that he had been referred for treatment, which included CT scans and chest x-rays, among other diagnostic tests.
Keep in mind that the role of the Adjudicator is to analyze whether Mr. Gibson had a reasonable excuse for failing to provide a sample. The analysis is done through review of the Report to Superintendent and all included materials, and also through review of all materials provided by the Applicant (in this case, Mr. Gibson). The Adjudicator may also rely on the Operator’s manual for the Alco-Sensor FST (the Approved Screening Device), which includes information such as proper operating temperature of the device, screen codes, and procedural standards.
Ultimately, the Adjudicator determined that Mr. Gibson’s version of events lacked credibility, and that his physician did not provide sufficient evidence that his medical condition would have prevented him from providing a suitable sample into the Alco-Sensor FST. In doing so, they advanced their interpretation of the testing requirements within the Operator’s manual – specifically, the wording used to describe the necessary airflow required to provide a sample:
“The Alco-Sensor FST has an automatic sampling system designed to ensure that a sample of deep lung air is obtained and analyzed. In order to trigger automatic sampling the subject must blow with a minimum flow rate, must produce a minimum breath volume, and blow for a minimum duration…”
On judicial review, Supreme Court Justice Tammen took issue with the Adjudicator’s interpretation of this issue. The Judge dissected the Adjudicator’s analysis and concluded that despite quoting the appropriate resource, the manual itself provided no information to estimate the “minimum” flow rate required.
Through the Adjudicator’s analysis, Justice Tammen determined that they had relied on information (relating to the required flow rate of a sample) that was not available to the Petitioner (or his physician) at the outset of his review with RoadSafety BC. This breached the Petitioner’s right to procedural fairness.
Justice Tammen directed that the Adjudicator’s decision confirming the IRP of the Petitioner be set aside, and that the matter be remitted to RoadSafety BC for a new hearing.
This case demonstrates a significant flaw in the IRP regime – that is, a blurring of the lines between adjudication and medical expertise. While adjudicators may have specialized knowledge of certain issues due to continued exposure via their employment, the boundaries in their role must be respected and enforced.
If you have received an Immediate Roadside Prohibition, an Administrative Driving Prohibition, or have been charged with Impaired Operation of a Conveyance, contact an experienced criminal lawyer at Tarnow Criminal Law as soon as possible. Our office is located in the heart of Richmond, only 20 minutes from downtown Vancouver on the Canada Line, and within 10 minutes of Vancouver International Airport (“YVR”).
Our firm is also licensed to work in the Yukon Territory, where the 90-day review process for impaired driving is an entirely different process. If you are facing impaired driving charges in the Yukon, contact our office as soon as possible for a consultation.
by Jason Tarnow | Feb 23, 2021 | Crime, Legal Rights, Police, Politics, Wheels Of Justice
On May 1, 2020, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau issued an Order in Council immediately banning the use, sale and transport of approximately 1,500 “assault” style firearms. This action was met with criticism from firearm owners, retailers and pro-gun advocates from across the country. A two-year amnesty period for restricted firearm owners will expire on April 30, 2022, which is around the time when Bill C-21 could come into effect.
At its first reading in the House of Commons on February 16, 2021, details about Bill C-21 emerged that created further frustration and confusion among Canadian firearm owners and retailers. Described as “an Act to amend certain Acts and to make consequential amendments (firearms)”, Bill C-21 will make substantive changes to both the Criminal Code and the Firearms Act, both of which are Federal legislation, thus impacting Canadians from coast to coast. It will also amend the Immigration and Refugee Act and the Nuclear Safety and Control Act.
Proposed amendments to the Criminal Code include:
- Increasing the maximum penalty of imprisonment for offences under Sections 95, 96, 99, 100 and 103 of the Criminal Code from 10 years to 14 years;
- Establishing a procedure that would allow any person to apply for an emergency prohibition order, or an emergency limitations on access order;
- Deem certain firearms to be prohibited devices for certain provisions;
- Create a new offence for altering a cartridge magazine to exceed its lawful capacity;
- Authorize employees of certain federal entities who are responsible for security to be considered as public officers for the purpose of section 117.07
One of the most concerning amendments, and the focus of today’s blog, involves establishing a procedure that would allow for any person to apply for an emergency prohibition order, or an emergency limitations on access order. The proposed amendment reads as follows:
Application for emergency prohibition order
110.1 (1) Any person may make an ex parte application to a provincial court judge for an order prohibiting another person from possessing any firearm, cross-bow, prohibited weapon, restricted weapon, prohibited device, ammunition, prohibited ammunition or explosive substance, or all such things, if the person believes on reasonable grounds that it is not desirable in the interests of the safety of the person against whom the order is sought or of any other person that the person against whom the order is sought should possess any such thing.
An ex parte application does not require notice to be given to the adverse party. This means that any person can make an application to a judge seeking the immediate prohibition (and subsequent seizure) of any of the items described in section 110.1(1). Success on the application is discussed next:
Emergency prohibition order
(2) If, at the conclusion of a hearing of an application made under subsection (1), the provincial court judge is satisfied that the circumstances referred to in that subsection exist and that an order should be made without delay to ensure the immediate protection of any person, the judge shall make an order prohibiting the person against whom the order is sought from possessing any firearm, cross-bow, prohibited weapon, restricted weapon, prohibited device, ammunition, prohibited ammunition or explosive substance, or all such things, for a period not exceeding 30 days, as is specified in the order, beginning on the day on which the order is made.
The seizure process will unfold one of two ways:
Warrant to search and seize
(4) If a provincial court judge is satisfied by information on oath that there are reasonable grounds to believe that a person who is subject to an order made under subsection (2) possesses, in a building, receptacle or place, any thing the possession of which is prohibited by the order, and that it is not desirable in the interests of the safety of the person, or of any other person, for the person to possess the thing, the judge may issue a warrant authorizing a peace officer to search the building, receptacle or place and seize any such thing, and every authorization, licence or registration certificate relating to any such thing, that is held by or in the possession of the person.
OR:
Search and seizure without warrant
(5) If, in respect of a person who is subject to an order made under subsection (2), a peace officer is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that it is not desirable, in the interests of the safety of the person, or of any other person, for the person to possess any thing the possession of which is prohibited by the order, the peace officer may, where the grounds for obtaining a warrant under subsection (4) exist but, by reason of a possible danger to the safety of the person or any other person, it would not be practicable to obtain a warrant, search for and seize any such thing, and any authorization, licence or registration certificate relating to any such thing, that is held by or in the possession of the person.
The seized items will remain in police custody for 30 days. When the Order expires, the seizing agency (police) must make an application for a Prohibition Order under Section 111(1) of the Criminal Code. This Application requires that the subject of the Order (the firearms/weapons owner) be given notice of the application, and the opportunity to respond in court. At this juncture, there are three ways the seized items can be returned to their owner:
- No application is made for a Prohibition Order under Section 111(1);
- If the hearing does not result in a Prohibition Order being made under Section 111(5);
- If the Order issued at the ex parte application is revoked
While this legislation seeks to establish an alternative procedure that gives the public power to seek protection from violence involving firearms and other weapons, it fails to address the possibility that this power could be abused. Currently, the law requires that an individual report their concerns to the police, who would then engage in an investigation to determine whether a seizure is necessary. When citizens assume this authority, there are a myriad of complications that could pose negative consequences not only to the potential subject of the Order, but to whomever makes the ex parte application. It requires that they take the law into their own hands – something that law enforcement regularly counsels against.
Bill C-21 is still in the early stages of the legislative process, but has garnered both support and criticism from those it will protect, and those it will harm.
