On May 1, 2020, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau issued an Order in Council immediately banning the use, sale and transport of approximately 1,500 “assault” style firearms. This action was met with criticism from firearm owners, retailers and pro-gun advocates from across the country. A two-year amnesty period for restricted firearm owners will expire on April 30, 2022, which is around the time when Bill C-21 could come into effect.
At its first reading in the House of Commons on February 16, 2021, details about Bill C-21 emerged that created further frustration and confusion among Canadian firearm owners and retailers. Described as “an Act to amend certain Acts and to make consequential amendments (firearms)”, Bill C-21 will make substantive changes to both the Criminal Code and the Firearms Act, both of which are Federal legislation, thus impacting Canadians from coast to coast. It will also amend the Immigration and Refugee Act and the Nuclear Safety and Control Act.
Proposed amendments to the Criminal Code include:
- Increasing the maximum penalty of imprisonment for offences under Sections 95, 96, 99, 100 and 103 of the Criminal Code from 10 years to 14 years;
- Establishing a procedure that would allow any person to apply for an emergency prohibition order, or an emergency limitations on access order;
- Deem certain firearms to be prohibited devices for certain provisions;
- Create a new offence for altering a cartridge magazine to exceed its lawful capacity;
- Authorize employees of certain federal entities who are responsible for security to be considered as public officers for the purpose of section 117.07
One of the most concerning amendments, and the focus of today’s blog, involves establishing a procedure that would allow for any person to apply for an emergency prohibition order, or an emergency limitations on access order. The proposed amendment reads as follows:
Application for emergency prohibition order
110.1 (1) Any person may make an ex parte application to a provincial court judge for an order prohibiting another person from possessing any firearm, cross-bow, prohibited weapon, restricted weapon, prohibited device, ammunition, prohibited ammunition or explosive substance, or all such things, if the person believes on reasonable grounds that it is not desirable in the interests of the safety of the person against whom the order is sought or of any other person that the person against whom the order is sought should possess any such thing.
An ex parte application does not require notice to be given to the adverse party. This means that any person can make an application to a judge seeking the immediate prohibition (and subsequent seizure) of any of the items described in section 110.1(1). Success on the application is discussed next:
Emergency prohibition order
(2) If, at the conclusion of a hearing of an application made under subsection (1), the provincial court judge is satisfied that the circumstances referred to in that subsection exist and that an order should be made without delay to ensure the immediate protection of any person, the judge shall make an order prohibiting the person against whom the order is sought from possessing any firearm, cross-bow, prohibited weapon, restricted weapon, prohibited device, ammunition, prohibited ammunition or explosive substance, or all such things, for a period not exceeding 30 days, as is specified in the order, beginning on the day on which the order is made.
The seizure process will unfold one of two ways:
Warrant to search and seize
(4) If a provincial court judge is satisfied by information on oath that there are reasonable grounds to believe that a person who is subject to an order made under subsection (2) possesses, in a building, receptacle or place, any thing the possession of which is prohibited by the order, and that it is not desirable in the interests of the safety of the person, or of any other person, for the person to possess the thing, the judge may issue a warrant authorizing a peace officer to search the building, receptacle or place and seize any such thing, and every authorization, licence or registration certificate relating to any such thing, that is held by or in the possession of the person.
Search and seizure without warrant
(5) If, in respect of a person who is subject to an order made under subsection (2), a peace officer is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that it is not desirable, in the interests of the safety of the person, or of any other person, for the person to possess any thing the possession of which is prohibited by the order, the peace officer may, where the grounds for obtaining a warrant under subsection (4) exist but, by reason of a possible danger to the safety of the person or any other person, it would not be practicable to obtain a warrant, search for and seize any such thing, and any authorization, licence or registration certificate relating to any such thing, that is held by or in the possession of the person.
The seized items will remain in police custody for 30 days. When the Order expires, the seizing agency (police) must make an application for a Prohibition Order under Section 111(1) of the Criminal Code. This Application requires that the subject of the Order (the firearms/weapons owner) be given notice of the application, and the opportunity to respond in court. At this juncture, there are three ways the seized items can be returned to their owner:
- No application is made for a Prohibition Order under Section 111(1);
- If the hearing does not result in a Prohibition Order being made under Section 111(5);
- If the Order issued at the ex parte application is revoked
While this legislation seeks to establish an alternative procedure that gives the public power to seek protection from violence involving firearms and other weapons, it fails to address the possibility that this power could be abused. Currently, the law requires that an individual report their concerns to the police, who would then engage in an investigation to determine whether a seizure is necessary. When citizens assume this authority, there are a myriad of complications that could pose negative consequences not only to the potential subject of the Order, but to whomever makes the ex parte application. It requires that they take the law into their own hands – something that law enforcement regularly counsels against.
Bill C-21 is still in the early stages of the legislative process, but has garnered both support and criticism from those it will protect, and those it will harm.
The internet is a precarious place. We buy, we sell, we talk – and we post. And while that’s all fine and good, it isn’t without consequence. Facebook launched in 2004, and since that time Canadian Courts have addressed and analyzed evidence obtained through Facebook and other social media platforms.
Recently, in a 2-1 decision, in R. v. Martin, 2021 NLCA 1, the Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal overturned a lower court’s decision deeming Facebook screenshots as inadmissible. In a 30 page decision, the Court of Appeal explained how the Provincial Court Judge (“PCJ”) had erred in their analysis of the rules of authentication in relation to the proposed electronic evidence.
The case involves allegations that the Accused, Mr. E. Martin, made threats against the Royal Newfoundland Constabulary (police), via pictures and written communication on Facebook. He was charged with being in possession of a knife for a purpose dangerous to the public peace, being in possession of a rifle for a purpose dangerous to the public peace, and uttering a threat to members of the Royal Newfoundland Constabulary.
The police had attended Mr. Martin’s residence one evening to follow up on a domestic disturbance complaint. The investigation went no further than a brief attendance at the Accused’s residence, which resulted in no further action being taken.
The investigation with respect to the charges in this case began when the police received an anonymous tip that the Accused had posted several pictures on Facebook indicating he planned to harm police.
It was the evening following their first visit to Mr. Martin’s residence that the police received the anonymous tip that indicated he had posted a menacing caption, directed at police, combined with photos that included firearms. The police again attended Mr. Martin’s residence, but were clearly not welcomed. They returned to the detachment and tried to view Mr. Martin’s Facebook page, but were unable to view any content. The police then contacted the anonymous tipster to ask if they would email pictures of the postings, which they did. In total, six screen shots were forwarded. The “screenshots” depicted an individual in various poses, kneeling with and holding various firearms that included a rifle and a long gun. The words “Ed’s Post” and “Ed Martin added 4 new photos” appeared as “banners” over the photos, in the typical Facebook font and symbolism.
These screenshots were at the centre of the Crown’s firearms and threats charges against the Accused. A Voir Dire was held to determine the admissibility of the screen shots. Ultimately, the PCJ declined to admit the photos as evidence, reasoning that these items had failed to be authenticated. The PCJ opined that since the anonymous tipster had not been called to give evidence, no one could testify that the screenshots were not altered or changed in anyway. The Court went further to say that there had been nothing to substantiate that the Accused even had a Facebook account, and even if they did, there was no way to determine conclusively that the Accused had been the one to author the posts depicted in the screenshots.
The Accused was convicted of being in possession of a knife for a dangerous purpose (which was found on him at the time of his arrest) but was acquitted on the charges of being in possession of a rifle for a dangerous purpose to the public peace, and uttering a threat to members of the Royal Newfoundland Constabulary. The Crown appealed the PCJ’s decision to rule the screenshots inadmissible – which brings us to the Court of Appeal’s analysis of the issue.
The Court of Appeal was thorough and careful to reiterate its explanation of a key component in their analysis: the threshold for admissibility of authenticated electronic documents under the Canada Evidence Act is low, and can be established by both direct and secondary evidence. The proposed electronic evidence must be capable of supporting a finding that the evidence sought to be admitted is what it purports to be.
The Crown submitted that the PCJ had been erroneous in ruling that the screenshots were not authenticated by the evidence adduced at Trial. At the Voir Dire, 10 witnesses, all police officers, were called including the officer who began the investigation and obtained the screenshots. This police officer testified that he was very familiar with the layout of Facebook, and the screenshots were consistent with what he knows of Facebook. While not accepted by the PCJ as an acceptable form of authentication, the Court of Appeal disagreed and suggested that the officer’s testimony was evidence that the screenshots were authentic. Further, the police officer testified about identifying striking similarities between what they saw when they were in attendance at the Accused’s home – clothing, personal items, layout of the residence – that mirrored what they had seen in two of the screenshots. The Court of Appeal found that this information aided in the authentication of the screenshots, and determined that it was not necessary to have the anonymous tipster’s testimony verifying their authenticity. No evidence to the contrary was introduced by the Defence.
The Court of Appeal stressed that authenticity does not determine authorship – meaning that although the evidence is admissible, it is not determinative of who actually authored the post. As a result of their analysis, the Crown’s appeal was allowed and the case was returned back to Provincial Court for further proceedings. As is standard practice, the Court of Appeal did not comment on what probative value the evidence may have.
The introduction of digital evidence in criminal proceedings will continue to create a myriad of issues for the courts to determine. The Charter was not written with these intricacies in mind – and the responsibility lays not only with the courts, but in the hands of criminal lawyers across the country. If your case involves digital evidence (social media postings, text messages, etc.) it is imperative that you contact experienced and seasoned counsel without delay. We are licensed to practice in British Columbia, the Yukon Territory and the Northwest Territories.
It has been six years since Matthew de Grood was charged with the murders of five young people at a house party in Calgary, Alberta, and four years since he was found to be Not Criminally Responsible for those offences.
It was concluded that de Grood was suffering from delusions, attributed to undiagnosed schizophrenia, when he caused the deaths of five schoolmates from a local university. He has been in a secure psychiatric facility ever since.
As we have discussed in previous posts, a finding of NCR is neither a determination of guilt, nor an acquittal. It is the beginning of alternative proceedings, which ultimately seek to determine if/when an Accused person can be released back into the community. Like all individuals found NCR, de Grood is required to appear before the Review Board to assess his progress, and to evaluate what freedoms, if any, he may be granted as a result of said progress.
Back in 2016, the Crown suggested it would be making an Application to seek a “High Risk NCR” designation for de Grood. Had this designation been imposed, his appearance before the Review Board would have been extended to take place every three years instead of annually. However – it appears that the Application was never made. This was likely due to the fact that the relevant legislation – the Not Criminally Responsible Reform Act – did not go into force until July 11, 2014, nearly 3 months after the offences took place. As such, the law could not be retroactively applied to de Grood’s case.
At his recent hearing, de Grood’s counsel spoke of the progress he has made during his time at the psychiatric facility. He has been afforded the opportunity to spend the night at his parent’s home on several occasions, taking hospital transportation to and from medical appointments, and volunteering with Meals on Wheels. His counsel submits that de Grood should be granted an absolute discharge due, in part, to the progress he has made with his mental health issues, including being cooperative with taking his medication – and recognizing the devastating consequences that would come as a result of not taking it. He has also demonstrated a high level of remorse for his actions.
Defence counsel further acknowledged that de Grood’s case is extremely high profile. There are concerns regarding the public’s reaction to seeing him on public transit, and how he may face serious adversity in transitioning to a group home.
The Review Board reserved its decision, and accordingly, de Grood remains in a psychiatric facility with heavy restrictions on his freedoms.
In one of our previous posts, we discussed biometric technology and the role it plays in Canadian law enforcement. It is, however, only one of the “predictive” tools utilized by the police in relation to criminal investigations.
A new report by the Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto goes into alarming detail regarding growth of algorithmic policing methods, and how this technology compromises the privacy rights of Canadian citizens. The report is incredibly thorough and comprehensive, delving into how this controversial technique offends various sections of our Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Firstly, though, it is important that our readers understand what algorithmic policing is.
The overall success of any algorithm is the system’s ability to gather, store, and analyze data – with law enforcement’s methodology being no different. A “location focused” algorithmic approach seeks to determine (predict) which areas are more likely to see criminal activity. The algorithmic system in these pursuits analyzes historical police data to identify geographical locations where crimes are, in theory, more likely to be committed. If this sounds familiar to you, then you’ve likely heard of, or accessed, the Vancouver Police Department’s GeoDash crime map – an online tool where you can navigate a map of the City of Vancouver by crime occurrence. You can choose from a variety of offences on the dropdown list, including homicide, break and enter, mischief, theft, and “offences against a person” which likely includes a variety of crimes such as sexual assault, assault causing bodily harm, and uttering threats. By looking at this map, you get an idea of which neighborhoods in Vancouver are most vulnerable to crime – except that it’s a little bit more sophisticated than that, and goes far beyond simply dropping a pin on the map. The public can see where the crime took place, but not who is alleged to have committed it. The offender’s personal information is logged, in as much detail as possible, and becomes part of a larger system dedicated to predictive surveillance – i.e., it creates a profile of which individuals are more likely to commit a particular crime. This profile can be used to identify people who are “more likely to be involved in potential criminal activity, or to assess an identified person for their purported risk of engaging in criminal activity in the future”.
While this information is definitely concerning, there is another issue: we have very little insight into the extent that this technology is being used. We know that the methods by which police gather information have historically discriminated against minority groups and those living in marginalized communities. This seems to guarantee that the VPD’s use of algorithmic investigative techniques relies on data that is often obtained through biased methods. We know that black and indigenous individuals are disproportionately represented in the correctional system, which can only mean that they are disproportionately represented in respect of these algorithms.
Although not everyone agrees that systemic racism exists within the VPD, the calls to address, unravel and mitigate the harm to marginalized groups continue to amplify. The idea that information collected under the apprehension of bias will not only remain on record, but will be used to further future investigations, is an indicator that Canadian law enforcement’s road to redemption will likely be a bumpy one.
Over the last couple of months, there has been outcry from the public urging the use of BWC’s (Body Worn Cameras) for Canadian law enforcement. Although initially in response to the growing unrest relating to police brutality in the United States, there are echoes of abandoned intentions from Canadian officials dating back at least a few years.
Back in 2015, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (“OPCC”) issued a publication regarding the use of BWC by police, in collaboration with privacy agencies in Alberta, New Brunswick and Quebec. The remaining Canadian law enforcement agencies from other provinces and territories acted “in consultation”.
For reference: according to the CBC, there were a total of 2 incidents involving the death of individuals at the hands of law enforcement in New Brunswick between 2012 and 2014, 12 incidents in Quebec, and 14 incidents in Alberta. Interestingly enough, British Columbia (on par with Quebec at 14 deaths) and Ontario (with the highest rate of police violence resulting in death in the country at 25 deaths between 2012 and 2014) were only acting in consultation.
The report hails the effectiveness of BWC to capture high quality images, videos, and audio recordings – so effective, in fact, that the OPCC had grave concerns regarding their ability to capture material that could jeopardize the privacy of innocent and uninvolved bystanders.
The report goes on to tout the value of BWC for evidentiary purposes, including analytics so sophisticated that the material obtained would likely be suitable for biometric comparison – aka, facial recognition.
There is no arguing the fact that the use of BWC by police has implications for the privacy of citizens in their everyday lives – especially since once fitted, citizens would likely expect on-duty officers to have their devices on a continuous basis as opposed to intermittently.
Benefits of BWC include the ability to review interactions between police and the public, recording communications between the police and suspects in the course of an investigation, identifying potential witnesses, and of course recording interactions between police officers. Many criminal cases involve evidence obtained through the use of dash cams, which provide audio from inside a police cruiser and video from the perspective of the driver. The effectiveness of this technology loses value when the investigation takes place outside of a police vehicle, as the audio often fails to capture intelligible communications between police and a suspect, or between officers themselves. Although the dash cam is kept running, the audio portion is often useless when the interactions between police and a suspect take place outside the vehicle, and the windows of the police cruiser are closed, or if the police/suspect leave the immediate area where the audio is successfully captured.
The report indicates that while continuous recording would undoubtedly provide a greater level of accountability for the actions of police, the threat to personal privacy reigns supreme:
“From an accountability perspective, continuous recording may be preferable because it captures an unedited recording of an officer’s actions and the officer cannot be accused of manipulating recordings for his or her own benefit. However, from a privacy perspective, collecting less or no personal information is always the preferred option”
In 2014, the Edmonton Police concluded a pilot project regarding the use of BWC by its officers. The conclusion?:
“The cameras had no effect on police use-of-force incidents and said there was no statistical difference in resolving police complaints”
According to an analysis done by CBC, there were a total of four deaths between 2012 and 2014 relating to officers of the Edmonton Police Service. By comparison, there were 9 deaths in the same period relating to officers of the Toronto Police Service. The results of the Pilot Project may have seen different results in a different jurisdiction.
The Edmonton Police explained that in addition to being ineffective to expose cases of police misconduct, the related expenses were simply unrealistic. Perhaps surprisingly, it’s not the cost of the devices themselves, but the expense to store and manage all of the material collected: somewhere between 6 and 15 million dollars over five years, which also includes hiring personnel qualified for the job.
Finding the balance between accountability, transparency and oversight of police against the protection of privacy for Canadian citizens is a legitimate and profound task – one that cannot be taken lightly. As the calls for BWC in Canadian law enforcement grow louder, and as Canadians revisit the reality of what it is to be privileged in this country, we can only hope that the values of dignity and equality are recognized as being more valuable than the cost of the equipment that very well could save lives.