by Jason Tarnow | Sep 3, 2026 | Crime, Police
In June, the Supreme Court of Canada released R. v. Berg, 2026 SCC 21, and every criminal defence lawyer in BC should have it bookmarked. The decision tackles a question I confront constantly in my Vancouver practice: in a trial that comes down to two conflicting accounts — the complainant’s word against the accused’s — how does a judge decide without turning the trial into a credibility contest?
The answer, the Court confirmed unanimously, is that a judge never simply picks the more believable witness. A conviction must rest on proof beyond a reasonable doubt, assessed against the whole of the evidence. Preferring one account over another is not enough.
That may sound like a truism. It isn’t. As Berg shows, appellate courts are still catching trial judges who slide — sometimes subtly — from “I believe the complainant” to “therefore the accused is guilty.” For anyone facing sexual assault charges in British Columbia or the Yukon, this decision matters.
Key Takeaways
- In R. v. Berg, 2026 SCC 21, a unanimous Supreme Court confirmed that convictions must rest on proof beyond a reasonable doubt — never on merely preferring the complainant’s testimony over the accused’s.
- The Court reined in R. v. J.J.R.D. (2006), 218 O.A.C. 37, in which Ontario case trial judges have long used when resolving conflicting testimony, holding it should generally not be relied on when assessing an accused person’s evidence.
- The classic framework from R. v. W.(D.), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742 remains the governing approach: even if the accused’s evidence is rejected, the Crown’s case must still prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
- Paired with R. v. Kinamore, 2025 SCC 19 — a BC appeal — the Supreme Court has now issued two significant sexual assault rulings in twelve months, both reinforcing procedural fairness for the accused.
- How a trial judge structures their credibility reasons is now fertile ground for appellate review in “word against word” cases.
What Happened in R. v. Berg
The facts were, in one sense, unremarkable — which is exactly why the case is so important. Mr. Berg met the complainant when he checked into the hotel where she worked. They exchanged contact information, stayed in touch, and she accepted an invitation to his room after her shift. She testified that he sexually assaulted her; he testified the intercourse was consensual. There was no third witness and no decisive physical evidence. The trial turned entirely on testimony.
The trial judge accepted the complainant’s evidence, rejected Mr. Berg’s account, and convicted him of sexual assault under s. 271 of the Criminal Code. A majority of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal upheld the conviction (2025 SKCA 85), but a dissenting judge would have ordered a new trial, concluding that the trial judge failed to properly grapple with inconsistencies in the complainant’s evidence about her alcohol and marijuana consumption. That dissent gave Mr. Berg an appeal as of right to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal — the conviction stands — but its reasons deliver guidance that will shape trials for years.
The J.J.R.D. Problem: How Courts Drifted Toward Credibility Contests
For nearly two decades, trial judges across Canada have leaned on R. v. J.J.R.D. (2006), 218 O.A.C. 37, an Ontario Court of Appeal decision, when explaining why they rejected an accused’s testimony. The case was routinely cited for the proposition that a judge may reject an accused’s uncontradicted evidence based on a “considered and reasoned acceptance” of the complainant’s conflicting account.
In Berg, the Supreme Court clarified that J.J.R.D. was really about something narrower: whether a trial judge’s reasons were detailed enough to permit appellate review. The Court held that trial judges should generally not rely on J.J.R.D.when assessing an accused person’s evidence or instructing a jury. Used incorrectly, it wrongly suggests a judge can reject the accused’s evidence simply because the judge accepts the complainant’s — a shortcut that inverts the burden of proof.
This is not an academic quibble. In my practice, I have read countless trial rulings where the reasoning ran, in substance: “The complainant was credible. I accept her evidence. It follows that I reject the accused’s denial.” Berg confirms that this chain of reasoning, standing alone, is an error of law.
W.(D.) Still Governs: The Three-Step Framework
The bedrock remains R. v. W.(D.), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742. The framework, familiar to every criminal lawyer in British Columbia, asks three questions where the accused testifies:
- If you believe the accused’s evidence, you must acquit.
- Even if you do not believe it, if it leaves you with a reasonable doubt, you must acquit.
- Even if the accused’s evidence does not raise a doubt, you must ask whether, on the evidence you do accept, the Crown has proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Berg reinforces that the third step is not a formality. The accused’s account must be considered against the totality of the evidence — not dismissed as the automatic by-product of believing the complainant. Notably, the Court found the trial judge in Berg did exactly what the law requires: he assessed Mr. Berg’s account in light of all the evidence before convicting. The conviction survived because the reasoning was sound, not because the complainant was preferred.
Berg and Kinamore: A Pattern at the Supreme Court
Berg does not stand alone. A year earlier, in R. v. Kinamore, 2025 SCC 19 — an appeal from our own BC courts — the Supreme Court unanimously quashed a sexual assault conviction and ordered a new trial. Kinamore held that evidence of a complainant’s sexual history, including sexual inactivity, is presumptively inadmissible under the principles animating s. 276 of the Criminal Code, and that the Crown must clear the same voir dire hurdle as the defence before leading it.
Read together, the two decisions send a consistent message: sexual assault trials are governed by rules of evidence and proof that protect both complainants and accused persons, and neither side gets a shortcut. For defence counsel, they are complementary tools — Kinamore polices what evidence gets in; Berg polices how the judge reasons once it is in.
What This Means for Accused Persons in BC and the Yukon
If you are charged with sexual assault in British Columbia, the odds are high that your trial will look like Berg’s: two accounts, no independent eyewitness, and a verdict that turns on testimony. Here is what a criminal defence lawyer in BC will be examining after this decision:
The structure of the judge’s reasons. In a judge-alone trial — the norm for s. 271 prosecutions in BC Provincial Court, where the Crown often proceeds by indictment but the accused elects trial by provincial court judge — the written or oral reasons must show that the accused’s evidence was weighed against the whole record. Reasons that leap from accepting the complainant to rejecting the accused are now squarely vulnerable on appeal.
Jury instructions. Where the trial is in the BC Supreme Court before a jury, defence counsel will scrutinize the charge to ensure the jury was not directed in a way that invites a credibility contest. Berg says J.J.R.D. language does not belong in jury instructions.
Inconsistencies in the Crown’s evidence. The dissent below focused on the complainant’s inconsistent statements about intoxication. While Mr. Berg ultimately lost, the case confirms that material inconsistencies must be genuinely analyzed — not waved away — when the judge assesses whether the Crown has met its burden.
Preserved appeal routes. Berg reached the Supreme Court because of a dissent in the provincial appeal court. It is a reminder that a strong appellate record starts at trial: objections to reasoning shortcuts, requests for particularized credibility findings, and careful cross-examination all preserve issues for review.
None of this is legal advice about any particular case — the factors above are what counsel examines, and every file turns on its own facts.
Why Experienced Counsel Matters in “Word Against Word” Trials
Cases like Berg are won and lost in the details: how cross-examination exposes inconsistency without alienating the trier of fact, whether evidentiary applications under ss. 276 and 278.92 to 278.94 of the Criminal Code are properly brought or resisted, and whether the trial record positions the defence for appeal if a conviction follows. These are craft skills built through years of trial work — precisely the kind of trials I have defended across sexual offence and assault files in Vancouver and throughout BC and the Yukon.
Frequently Asked Questions
Can I be convicted of sexual assault just because the judge believes the complainant more than me?
No. R. v. Berg, 2026 SCC 21 confirms that a conviction cannot rest on merely preferring the complainant’s account. The Crown must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the whole of the evidence, and the judge must explain why your evidence, considered against that record, did not raise a doubt.
What is the W.(D.) framework?
It is the three-step approach from R. v. W.(D.), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742: acquit if you believe the accused; acquit if the accused’s evidence leaves a reasonable doubt; and even if it does not, convict only if the evidence you accept proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Does R. v. Berg apply in British Columbia?
Yes. Supreme Court of Canada decisions bind every court in Canada, including the BC Provincial Court, BC Supreme Court, BC Court of Appeal, and the Yukon courts.
Can a conviction be appealed if the trial judge’s credibility reasoning was flawed?
Potentially. Flawed credibility reasoning — such as rejecting the accused’s evidence solely because the complainant was believed — can be an error of law supporting an appeal. Strict deadlines apply, so speak to a criminal defence lawyer promptly.
What should I do if I’m charged with sexual assault in BC?
Exercise your right to silence, do not contact the complainant, and retain experienced defence counsel before your first court appearance. Early decisions — including Crown election, bail conditions, and evidentiary applications — can shape the entire case.
This article is general legal information, not legal advice, and reading it does not create a solicitor-client relationship. Sexual assault allegations carry serious consequences, and every case turns on its own facts. If you are facing charges, retain qualified defence counsel without delay.
by Jason Tarnow | Jul 14, 2026 | Crime, Criminal Attorney, Legal Rights, Police, Wheels Of Justice
As a Vancouver criminal defence lawyer with years of experience navigating the complexities of Canadian criminal law in British Columbia courts, I’ve seen firsthand how legislative changes can reshape the justice system. With the Bail and Sentencing Reform Act (Bill C-14) now law and set to take effect on July 15, 2026, we’re on the cusp of significant shifts in how bail hearings and sentencing proceed across Canada, particularly here in Vancouver where issues like organized crime, auto theft, and repeat offending hit close to home.
This timely reform arrives amid ongoing public concerns about community safety in BC. In this post, I’ll break down the key changes in Bill C-14, their legal context, and what they mean for defendants, practitioners, and the broader criminal justice landscape in Vancouver and beyond.
The Road to Bill C-14: Context in Canadian Criminal Law
Bill C-14 introduces over 80 targeted amendments to the Criminal Code, the Youth Criminal Justice Act, and related statutes. It responds to calls from law enforcement, provinces (including BC), and victims’ advocates for stricter measures against violent and repeat offenders, while aiming to maintain Charter protections.
Historically, Canadian bail law has been guided by principles from the Supreme Court of Canada, such as in R. v. Antic (2017), which emphasized the “ladder principle” (least onerous conditions) and the “principle of restraint” favoring release where appropriate. The Charter’s section 11(e) guarantees the right not to be denied reasonable bail without just cause. Sentencing has balanced denunciation, deterrence, rehabilitation, and proportionality under section 718 of the Criminal Code.
Bill C-14 refines these without fully upending them, but it tilts the balance toward public safety in specific high-risk scenarios. As reforms come into force this week, defence counsel in Vancouver must adapt quickly.
Key Changes to Bail Laws: Harder for Repeat and Violent Offenders
One of the most impactful areas is bail. Bill C-14 expands reverse onus provisions, where the accused must demonstrate why release is justified rather than the Crown proving detention is necessary. New or expanded reverse onuses now apply to:
- Break and enter of a dwelling-house.
- Trafficking in persons and human smuggling.
- Assaults and sexual assaults involving choking, suffocation, or strangulation.
- Extortion involving violence.
- Serious violent offences where the accused has two or more prior similar convictions.
- Expansion of the prior conviction window from 5 to 10 years for certain weapon-related violence.
Courts must now consider additional factors, such as random or unprovoked violence, the number and seriousness of outstanding charges (enhancing the tertiary ground for detention), and specific conditions like weapons prohibitions for extortion and organized crime cases. The “ladder principle” is clarified not to apply in reverse onus situations, and certain prior serious offenders are restricted from acting as sureties.
For Vancouver practitioners, this means more rigorous bail plans are essential. In BC Supreme Court or Provincial Court hearings, we’ll need to present compelling evidence addressing public safety risks—perhaps through enhanced surety supervision, electronic monitoring, or treatment programs. Clients facing auto theft, home invasion, or organized crime charges (prevalent in the Lower Mainland) will face heightened scrutiny.
Sentencing Reforms: Tougher Consequences and Consecutive Terms
On the sentencing side, Bill C-14 introduces or expands aggravating factors for crimes against first responders, public transit workers, organized retail theft, and interference with essential infrastructure (e.g., copper theft). Judges must prioritize denunciation and deterrence for repeat violent auto theft and break-and-enter. Consecutive sentences are mandated or strongly considered in cases like extortion paired with arson, or multiple violent offences.
Additional measures include ending conditional sentences (house arrest) for certain serious sexual offences against minors and restoring driving prohibitions for manslaughter or criminal negligence causing death/bodily harm.
These changes align with trends in BC, where prolific offenders and retail crime have strained resources. However, they raise questions about over-incarceration, court delays, and the effectiveness of deterrence for root causes like addiction and mental health—issues defence lawyers address daily in Vancouver.
Implications for Defendants and Defence Practice in Vancouver
For those accused in BC, the practical effects are clear: bail hearings will be more adversarial and evidence-heavy, especially in reverse onus cases. Defence counsel must build stronger records early—gathering character references, risk assessments, and community support plans. In Vancouver, where courthouse backlogs persist, prolonged pre-trial detention could pressure pleas or complicate trials.
From a Charter perspective, these reforms will likely face challenges. Past SCC decisions underscore that bail must remain reasonable and not punitive. Defence lawyers will monitor for overbreadth or violations of presumption of innocence. For repeat offenders, the emphasis on public safety is understandable, but it must not erode individualized justice.
As a Vancouver criminal defence lawyer, I see opportunities too. Strong advocacy can still secure release with tailored plans, and at sentencing, mitigating factors like Gladue principles for Indigenous clients or rehabilitation efforts remain vital. These reforms underscore the need for early intervention and robust defence strategies.
Provincial implementation in BC will be key. Adequate resources for bail supervision, mental health supports, and court capacity are essential to avoid unintended consequences like overcrowded jails.
Broader Impacts on the Justice System and Public Safety
Bill C-14 reflects a policy shift toward accountability for serious crime while acknowledging that laws alone aren’t sufficient. Supporters, including BC officials and police, highlight benefits for victims and communities plagued by repeat offending. Critics, including some civil liberties groups, worry about reduced discretion and potential Charter issues.
For law students and the public, this is a prime example of how criminal law evolves in response to societal pressures. In Vancouver’s diverse context—with its challenges around organized crime, homelessness, and downtown eastside issues—balanced implementation matters.
Long-term, data collection mandated by the Act (annual bail reports) will help evaluate effectiveness. A five-year parliamentary review is also required.
Practical Takeaways for Clients and Practitioners
- Act Early: If facing charges potentially impacted by Bill C-14 (effective July 15, 2026), consult defence counsel immediately to prepare for stricter bail processes.
- Build Comprehensive Plans: Focus on risk mitigation—treatment, employment, housing—for bail and sentencing.
- Stay Informed: Reforms affect youth justice and specific offences; nuances matter.
- Advocate Holistically: While tougher laws address safety, support for prevention and rehabilitation remains crucial.
In my practice defending clients across Vancouver and BC, I remain committed to upholding rights within the evolving framework. These changes demand vigilance but also skilled, strategic representation.
This blog post is for educational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Every case is unique—contact a qualified Vancouver criminal defence lawyer for personalized guidance on your situation.
by Jason Tarnow | Jun 29, 2022 | Crime, Media, Politics
In May of 2022, the Supreme Court of Canada determined that stacking parole ineligibility for multiple murders is unconstitutional under Canadian law.
In 2011, Stephen Harper’s government passed legislation relating to sentencing provisions in the Criminal Code that would allow Judges to impose parole ineligibility far beyond the minimum of 25 years on the offence of First Degree Murder, pursuant to Section 745.51.
Since that time, several sentences have been passed in imposing parole ineligibility, with the most lengthy sentence being no parole eligibility for 75 years in the case of Douglas Garland, who was found guilty of murdering two adults and their grandson. Garland appealed his sentence to the Alberta Court of Appeal, where it was upheld.
It was the case of the Quebec mosque shooter, Alexandre Bissonnette, that resulted in a unanimous decision from all nine Supreme Court Justices to rule that the sentencing provision violated Section 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, granting protection against cruel and unusual punishment. Bissonnette pleaded guilty to 6 counts of First Degree murder and six counts of attempted murder, and the Crown had asked for a parole ineligibility period of 150 years – 25 consecutive years for each of the six people he murdered – which would have been the harshest sentence handed down in Canada since the abolishment of capital punishment. The presiding Judge declined, and instead sentence Bissonnette to 40 years before he could apply for Parole. Criminal defence counsel appealed to the Quebec Court of Appeal in 2020, and the sentence was reduced to 25 years. The Crown then appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, which led to the landmark decision to cap parole ineligibility at 25 years.
With this decision, those incarcerated under the stacked ineligibility provision are seeking to have their sentences reduced, which has caused a great deal of alarm to the public. It is important to remember that someone convicted of first degree murder will have eligibility at Parole after 25 years – but that does not guarantee their release by any means. The Parole Board looks at many factors when determining whether or not to grant Parole, including the actual offence itself, criminal and social history, rehabilitation efforts, and remorse. Their review of an individuals history when considering release is thorough and rigid. Victim impact statements from family members and loved ones are also taken into consideration.
The decision from the SCC included the following passage:
“This appeal is not about the value of each human life, but rather about the limits of the state’s power to punish offenders.”
This is a reminder that the Court’s decision to limit parole ineligibility is not meant to diminish loss of life, or to favour offenders. It reaffirms that our government, including judicial institutions, must abide by limits to ensure that Canada remains a fair and just society for all.
If you have been charged with a criminal offence in British Columbia (including, but not limited to: Richmond, Vancouver, Surrey, Delta, Langley, Coquitlam, New Westminster, Abbotsford, Victoria, Nanaimo, Kamloops, Kelowna) or the Yukon Territory (including but not limited to: Whitehorse, Dawson City, Watson Lake, Haines Junction, Mayo, Old Crow) contact experienced counsel at Tarnow Criminal Law without delay.
by Jason Tarnow | Jan 20, 2021 | Crime, Legal Rights, Police, Social Media, Wheels Of Justice
The internet is a precarious place. We buy, we sell, we talk – and we post. And while that’s all fine and good, it isn’t without consequence. Facebook launched in 2004, and since that time Canadian Courts have addressed and analyzed evidence obtained through Facebook and other social media platforms.
Recently, in a 2-1 decision, in R. v. Martin, 2021 NLCA 1, the Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal overturned a lower court’s decision deeming Facebook screenshots as inadmissible. In a 30 page decision, the Court of Appeal explained how the Provincial Court Judge (“PCJ”) had erred in their analysis of the rules of authentication in relation to the proposed electronic evidence.
The case involves allegations that the Accused, Mr. E. Martin, made threats against the Royal Newfoundland Constabulary (police), via pictures and written communication on Facebook. He was charged with being in possession of a knife for a purpose dangerous to the public peace, being in possession of a rifle for a purpose dangerous to the public peace, and uttering a threat to members of the Royal Newfoundland Constabulary.
The police had attended Mr. Martin’s residence one evening to follow up on a domestic disturbance complaint. The investigation went no further than a brief attendance at the Accused’s residence, which resulted in no further action being taken.
The investigation with respect to the charges in this case began when the police received an anonymous tip that the Accused had posted several pictures on Facebook indicating he planned to harm police.
It was the evening following their first visit to Mr. Martin’s residence that the police received the anonymous tip that indicated he had posted a menacing caption, directed at police, combined with photos that included firearms. The police again attended Mr. Martin’s residence, but were clearly not welcomed. They returned to the detachment and tried to view Mr. Martin’s Facebook page, but were unable to view any content. The police then contacted the anonymous tipster to ask if they would email pictures of the postings, which they did. In total, six screen shots were forwarded. The “screenshots” depicted an individual in various poses, kneeling with and holding various firearms that included a rifle and a long gun. The words “Ed’s Post” and “Ed Martin added 4 new photos” appeared as “banners” over the photos, in the typical Facebook font and symbolism.
These screenshots were at the centre of the Crown’s firearms and threats charges against the Accused. A Voir Dire was held to determine the admissibility of the screen shots. Ultimately, the PCJ declined to admit the photos as evidence, reasoning that these items had failed to be authenticated. The PCJ opined that since the anonymous tipster had not been called to give evidence, no one could testify that the screenshots were not altered or changed in anyway. The Court went further to say that there had been nothing to substantiate that the Accused even had a Facebook account, and even if they did, there was no way to determine conclusively that the Accused had been the one to author the posts depicted in the screenshots.
The Accused was convicted of being in possession of a knife for a dangerous purpose (which was found on him at the time of his arrest) but was acquitted on the charges of being in possession of a rifle for a dangerous purpose to the public peace, and uttering a threat to members of the Royal Newfoundland Constabulary. The Crown appealed the PCJ’s decision to rule the screenshots inadmissible – which brings us to the Court of Appeal’s analysis of the issue.
The Court of Appeal was thorough and careful to reiterate its explanation of a key component in their analysis: the threshold for admissibility of authenticated electronic documents under the Canada Evidence Act is low, and can be established by both direct and secondary evidence. The proposed electronic evidence must be capable of supporting a finding that the evidence sought to be admitted is what it purports to be.
The Crown submitted that the PCJ had been erroneous in ruling that the screenshots were not authenticated by the evidence adduced at Trial. At the Voir Dire, 10 witnesses, all police officers, were called including the officer who began the investigation and obtained the screenshots. This police officer testified that he was very familiar with the layout of Facebook, and the screenshots were consistent with what he knows of Facebook. While not accepted by the PCJ as an acceptable form of authentication, the Court of Appeal disagreed and suggested that the officer’s testimony was evidence that the screenshots were authentic. Further, the police officer testified about identifying striking similarities between what they saw when they were in attendance at the Accused’s home – clothing, personal items, layout of the residence – that mirrored what they had seen in two of the screenshots. The Court of Appeal found that this information aided in the authentication of the screenshots, and determined that it was not necessary to have the anonymous tipster’s testimony verifying their authenticity. No evidence to the contrary was introduced by the Defence.
The Court of Appeal stressed that authenticity does not determine authorship – meaning that although the evidence is admissible, it is not determinative of who actually authored the post. As a result of their analysis, the Crown’s appeal was allowed and the case was returned back to Provincial Court for further proceedings. As is standard practice, the Court of Appeal did not comment on what probative value the evidence may have.
The introduction of digital evidence in criminal proceedings will continue to create a myriad of issues for the courts to determine. The Charter was not written with these intricacies in mind – and the responsibility lays not only with the courts, but in the hands of criminal lawyers across the country. If your case involves digital evidence (social media postings, text messages, etc.) it is imperative that you contact experienced and seasoned counsel without delay. We are licensed to practice in British Columbia, the Yukon Territory and the Northwest Territories.
by Jason Tarnow | Oct 2, 2020 | Crime, Legal Rights, Media, Police, Politics, Wheels Of Justice
Whenever incidents relating to terrorism in Canada hit the news, the eyes of Canadians widen with revolt. Recent headlines elicited a similar response, with a healthy dose of confusion and curiosity added to the mix.
On September 21, 2020, criminal charges were announced against 25 year old Ontario resident Shehroze Chaudhry – but not due to allegations of committing acts of terrorism. Rather, Chaudhry has been charged under Section 83.231(1) of the Criminal Code – perpetrating a hoax regarding terrorist activity:
83.231 (1) Every one commits an offence who, without lawful excuse and with intent to cause any person to fear death, bodily harm, substantial damage to property or serious interference with the lawful use or operation of property:
(a) conveys or causes or procures to be conveyed information that, in all the circumstances, is likely to cause a reasonable apprehension that terrorist activity is occurring or will occur, without believing the information to be true; or
(b) commits an act that, in all the circumstances, is likely to cause a reasonable apprehension that terrorist activity is occurring or will occur, without believing that such activity is occurring or will occur.
Chaudhry was a frequent guest on an award winning New York Times podcast known as “Caliphate”. He spoke, in gruesome detail, of his time as an ISIS executioner in Syria, among other things. But the charges levelled against him assert that his personal experiences as an ISIS soldier are fabricated.
While the NYT claimed to have verified his role in ISIS, he gave conflicting accounts to CBC, even going so far as to say he would take a polygraph to prove he had never killed anyone. He likely thought this would absolve him any criminal liability relating to terrorism offences in Canada, but the charges against him refute this misconception.
The details released from the police don’t specify if any other person was harmed or killed due to the alleged yarn by Chaudhry, but they will play a determinative role if he is convicted. The sentences range from a fine and imprisonment in a provincial correctional institution if prosecuted summarily, to life imprisonment should Crown proceed by indictment.
Chaudhry’s case demonstrates that Canadian jurisprudence condemns all activity relating to terrorism – whether it’s the real deal or not.
